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Against Feasibility Analysis
Jonathan Masur and Eric A. Posner1

Abstract. Feasibility analysis, a method of evaluating government regulations, has emerged as the
major alternative to cost-benefit analysis. Although regulatory agencies have used feasibility
analysis (in some contexts called “technology-based” analysis) longer than cost-benefit analysis,
feasibility analysis has received far less attention in the scholarly literature. In recent years,
however, critics of cost-benefit analysis have offered feasibility analysis as a superior alternative.
We advance the debate by uncovering the analytic structure of feasibility analysis and its
normative premises, and then criticizing them. Our account builds on two examples of feasibility
analysis, one conducted by OSHA and the other by EPA. We find that feasibility analysis leads to
both under- and over-regulation, and we conclude that it lacks a normative justification and should
have no place in government regulation.

Feasibility analysis, a method of evaluating government regulations, has emerged as the
major alternative to cost-benefit analysis. A regulation satisfies feasibility analysis if it reduces a
risk of harm to the maximum extent possible without having a major negative impact on the
economy such as “widespread plant closings.” By contrast, a regulation satisfies cost-benefit
analysis if it produces benefits (in terms of deaths, injuries, and other losses avoid) greater than
the cost of compliance. Although agencies have used feasibility analysis (in some contexts,
called “technology-based” analysis) longer than cost-benefit analysis, feasibility analysis has
received far less attention in the scholarly literature. In recent years, however, critics of costbenefit analysis have offered feasibility analysis as a superior alternative. The dispute over these
standards will carry over into the Obama administration,2 and for that reason a critical
assessment of the feasibility standard is long overdue.
When Congress authorizes agencies to regulate, it occasionally provides detailed
instructions but more typically issues vague standards. These standards appear in numerous
different formulations, but most statutes fall into two groups. In the first, Congress directs the
agency to reduce a risk to the extent “feasible,” or to the “maximum” extent, with no mention of
costs. For example, the Occupational Health and Safety Act requires the OHSA secretary to
ensure “to the extent feasible” that exposure to hazards in the workplace does not harm workers’

1

University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Emily Buss, Adam Cox, Frank Easterbrook, Jake Gersen, Martha
Nussbaum, Arden Rowell, Adam Samaha, David Weisbach, Adrian Vermeule, and participants at a workshop at the
University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments, and to Charles Woodworth for excellent research
assistance.
2
President Obama has nominated Cass Sunstein, a prominent defender of cost-benefit analysis, to head the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs. See CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (2004). Two prominent critics, Liza
Heinzerling and Chris Schroeder, have been appointed to positions in EPA and the Justice Department, respectively.
Both Heinzerling and Schroeder have endorsed feasibility analysis. See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in
the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2006); Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond
Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433 (2008).

health.3 In the second, Congress directs the agency to consider the costs as well as the benefits of
risk reduction. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act directs the EPA to consider “all
relevant aspects of the risk . . . and a comparison of the estimated costs of complying with
actions taken under this chapter.”4 Agencies tend to use feasibility analysis for the first category
of statute and cost-benefit analysis for the second category of statute, though it is by no means
clear that they are legally obligated to do so, and there are some exceptions and mixed cases.
Courts have afforded agencies significant latitude under the Chevron doctrine.5
In 1981, President Reagan issued an executive order requiring agencies to use costbenefit analysis for major regulations.6 His successors through George W. Bush have renewed
that order;7 President Obama has not yet acted. The executive orders do not require agencies to
use cost-benefit analysis in violation of statutory mandates, so their effect has been to more
sharply bifurcate agency practice. Agencies applying statutes that permit them to consider costs
have, since 1981, applied cost-benefit analysis more rigorously and systematically. Agencies
applying statutes that do not permit them to consider costs, or permit them to do so in a fashion
that falls short of cost-benefit analysis, now report cost-benefit analyses of their regulations but
do not follow them and instead continue to use feasibility analysis to guide regulatory decisionmaking.
President Reagan’s executive order unleashed an enormous literature on cost-benefit
analysis. The debate continues to this day. Defenders argue that cost-benefit analysis produces
better regulations, enhances transparency, and brings rigor to the regulatory process.8 Critics
argue that cost-benefit analysis has weak normative foundations and, in practice, forces agencies
to ignore real but difficult-to-monetize regulatory benefits, resulting in underregulation of the
environment, the workplace, and other domains.9 Until recently, the critics have never been very
3
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clear about what decision-procedure they prefer to cost-benefit analysis. But feasibility analysis
has become their white knight. They argue that feasibility analysis rests on a stronger normative
foundation than cost-benefit analysis does, and is just as rigorous and transparent.10
There is an earlier literature from the 1980s and 1990s that criticized environmental
regulation that relied on technology-based standards—a quasi-synonym for feasibility analysis.
However, this literature had a different focus from the current debate.11 Then, critics argued that
EPA’s regulations were costly and inefficient because command-and-control regulation fails to
exploit market incentives.12 The criticism led to proposals that cap-and-trade systems and similar
market-based mechanisms be used, and endorsement in some quarters of cost-benefit analysis.13
But the critics never addressed feasibility analysis on its own terms. It may well have been that
EPA never applied the test appropriately rather than that the test was flawed.
Part of the problem was no doubt that the feasibility test had never been given a clear
account. What does it mean to say that an agency must reduce a risk to the point at which
“widespread plant closings” occur? Can this term be given a precise definition? And why exactly
are widespread plant closings to be avoided? These questions have not received clear answers,
with the result that the debate has proceeded in a cloud of ambiguity. We try to advance the
debate by uncovering the analytic structure of feasibility analysis and its normative premises, and
then criticizing them.14 Our account builds on two examples of feasibility analysis, one
conducted by OSHA and the other by EPA.15 We conclude that feasibility analysis lacks a
normative justification and should have no place in government regulation.
10

David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility
Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005); Driesen et al.,
supra note 9; ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 205-07 (defending technology-based standards of Clean
Air Act); Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Administration, 34 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,297 (2004) (arguing that the EPA must employ feasibility analysis); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); Wendy E. Wagner, The
Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83 (2000); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Thomas O. McGarrity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale For Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729
(1991); FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW 90 (1989). See also DANIEL
FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999)
(proposing a reconciliation of cost-benefit analysis and feasibility analysis that combines elements of each); Sidney
A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV.
ENVT’L L. REV. 433, 483-84 (2008) (proposing a type of “pragmatic” risk analysis largely consistent with feasibility
analysis).
11
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333
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Others have criticized feasibility analysis, usually on the grounds that it is vague. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8.
But as defenders have pointed out, all decision-procedures, including cost-benefit analysis, have this problem, at
least to some extent. Other critics have addressed the record of its use by agencies. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart,
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15
These examples are only two of many that have been issued over the years. We have not tried to do a survey but
we chose these two because they seem representative and are relatively clear. After the EPA regulation we discuss
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I. Legal Background
Feasibility analysis is not a single statutory standard, nor is it a single, consistent
methodology. Rather, feasibility analysis is a term that encompasses a spectrum of agency
practices taken under the ambit of a wide variety of statutory mandates. All of these statutes by
their plain terms appear to demand some type of stringent health or safety regulation that does
not rely on calculations of costs and benefits. In the sections that follow, we describe the legal
apparatus surrounding feasibility analysis in some detail.
A. Statutory Framework
When Congress regulates an environmental or workplace hazard, it frequently does so on
a technological or results-oriented basis. That is, Congress often mandates the installation of a
particular level of pollution-controlling technology, or more generally it requires that an agency
achieve a particular level of safety with respect to some hazard. The level of technology or the
result sought is frequently described in vague terms by Congress, leaving the agency with ample
interpretive authority. Nonetheless, many of these statutory mandates share a common feature:
they require the most protective or restrictive level of pollution or hazard control possible,
subject only to modest limitations. For instance, one section of the Clean Air Act requires that
polluters install the “best available control technology” with the goal of achieving the “maximum
available reduction” of regulated air pollutants.16 At the same time, these statutes do not
explicitly require a comparison of costs and benefits. Rather, regulated industries are directed to
install a type of technology or achieve a level of safety, whose benefits are left unspecified. The
limitations placed on the technology are occasionally couched in terms of costs,17 but are more
frequently left in more demanding (if vaguer) terms—for instance, “best available technology.”.
Scholars have argued that these statutes call for “feasibility analysis,” a term borrowed
from the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which protects workplace safety “to the extent
feasible.”18 According to these scholars, an agency regulating under one of these statutory
provisions should not engage in cost-benefit analysis. Rather, it should examine only whether a
particular level of regulation is technologically and economically feasible: whether the
technological means exist to implement the regulation, and whether the regulation will cause
significant economic harm to the regulated industry, to the point of triggering “widespread plant

was issued, EPA issued guidelines on its regulatory approach, including its use of feasibility analysis. These
guidelines are consistent with the approach that it used in the regulation that we examine, and subsequent
regulations seem largely consistent with it as well. See
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/Guidelines.html.
16
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (Clean Air Act).
17
E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (mandating the “maximum degree of reduction . . . achievable . . .taking into
consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction . . . .”).
18
29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5).
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shutdowns.”19 Only regulations that would threaten to bankrupt a large segment of the affected
industry are barred under feasibility analysis.20 According to this conception of feasibility
analysis, an agency cannot select a less stringent regulatory standard (among several options)
when the more stringent option would not lead to plant shutdowns.21 It is thus unsurprising that
feasibility analysis has generally been regarded as favoring strong regulation, by comparison to
cost-benefit analysis.
At the same time, the general heading of “feasibility analysis” masks wide variation
among both statutory mandates and actual agency practices. In later sections we examine the
ways in which OSHA and EPA actually perform feasibility analysis. Here, we canvas several of
the most important statutory phrases that are understood to trigger some version of feasibility
analysis. In order to provide a standard for comparison, we also highlight several statutes that
appear to call for something closer to cost-benefit analysis.
1. Workplace Safety
The term “feasibility analysis” derives from the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
which instructs OSHA to set the standard “which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible .
. . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.”22 That
standard must be “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment
and places of employment.”23 “Most adequately assures, to the extent feasible” reads as though
the full extent of costs and benefits are largely irrelevant. The regulator is to require a safety
measure, as long as the measure is “feasible.” “[R]easonably necessary . . . to provide safe or
healthful employment” appears to incorporate some measure of the benefits provided, but
without any directive to balance them against costs.
Similarly, the Mine Act instructs the Secretary of Labor to “set standards which most
adequately assure on the basis of the best available evidence that no miner will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity.”24 That section notes that “[i]n addition to the
attainment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the miner, other
considerations shall be . . . the feasibility of the standards . . . .”25 This statute, like the safety and
health statute, makes no mention of compliance costs.
19

Driesen, supra note 10, at 3 (2005); see also Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 2, at 483; Heinzerling, supra note 2,
at 1102 n. 37.
20
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272 (D.C.Cir.1980) (“[A]s for
economic feasibility, OSHA must construct a reasonable estimate of compliance costs and demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood that these costs will not threaten the existence or competitive structure of an industry, even if it does
portend disaster for some marginal firms.”).
21
Driesen, supra note 10, at 17; Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1505 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
22
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5).
23
29 U.S.C § 652(8).
24
30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6)(A).
25
Id.
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2. Environmental Protection
Environmental statutes involve an extensive array of verbal formulations, some of which
appear to trigger feasibility analysis and others of which call for an approach more akin to costbenefit analysis.
Best available technology. The Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards
and Prevention of Significant Deterioration programs instruct the EPA to require that each new
pollution-emitting firm employ “the best available control technology for each pollutant.”26 The
Clean Air Act elsewhere defines “best available control technology” to mean a technology that
will provide “the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant . . . which the permitting
authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic
impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility.”27 Similarly, the New Source
provisions of the Clean Air Act sets as the EPA’s regulatory goal “the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction . . . (taking
into account the cost of achieving such reduction . . .).”28 Here, as with OSHA, the objective is
stated in categorical terms (“maximum degree of reduction”), and while the statute references
economic costs, regulation is subject only to the limitation that those reductions be “achievable.”
As proponents of feasibility analysis have noted, the most straightforward way of achieving the
maximum degree of reduction of a particular pollutant is to simply close down every factory that
creates it.29 In that sense, proponents of feasibility analysis view the principle that regulation
must not trigger widespread bankruptcies as a concession to practical economic realities.
Similarly, portions of the Clean Water Act require the use of “the best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental impact,”30 while others “require application of
the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class”31 or the
“greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable
through application of the best available demonstrated control technology.”32 Like the Clean Air
Act, however, these statutory provisions are not silent on matters of costs. When regulating
pursuant to these statutes, the EPA must “take into consideration the cost of achieving”
reductions in water pollution.33 At the same time, categorical insistence upon the “best available
technology,” subject only to the consideration that it be “economically achievable” (or that the
agency merely “consider” costs), has led sympathetic observers to conclude that the statute
demands feasibility analysis, rather than cost-benefit analysis.
26

42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4).
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).
28
42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
29
Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975);
Driesen, supra note 10, at 10.
30
33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
31
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i).
32
33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1).
33
33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B).
27
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These formulations are of course not identical; it may be that in differentiating between
the “best available control technology” and the “best available demonstrated control technology”
Congress meant to define some important difference in treatment. However, despite these
variations, the EPA has largely behaved as if these statutory standards called for similar types
and levels of regulation.34
“Reasonably available” and “best practicable” technology. Not all environmental
statutes are so strict. Several provisions of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act call for a type
of review similar to cost-benefit analysis or set a more lenient regulatory standard than those
listed above. For instance, the section of the Clean Air Act governing “non-attainment areas”—
those parts of the country that have not met the EPA’s ambient air quality standards—calls for
“the implementation of all reasonably available control measures,” including “reasonably
available control technology.”35 Similarly, a general provision of the Clean Water Act governing
pollutant discharges calls for “the application of the best practicable control technology currently
available.”36 In determining what technology to classify as the “best practicable,” the EPA is
expected to “consider[] of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent
reduction benefits to be achieved from such application.”37 Another section of the Clean Water
Act directs the EPA to “require application of the best conventional pollutant control
technology,”38 and in so doing to “include consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship
between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits
derived.”39
The Clean Water Act’s admonition to consider the reasonableness of the relationship
between costs and benefits in the course of choosing the “best practicable” technology is best
understood as calling for cost-benefit analysis. Other readings of the statute are certainly
conceivable, but even opponents of cost-benefit analysis have admitted that this is the best
interpretation of that provision.40 The Clean Air Act, for its part, stops short of explicitly
requiring cost-benefit analysis. Nonetheless, the use of “reasonableness” as a touchstone seems
to beg for a comparison of costs and benefits, just as it does in other areas of law.41
We summarize the most important of these statutes in Table A1 in the Appendix.

34

See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1).
36
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A)(i).
37
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
38
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E).
39
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B).
40
Driesen, supra note 19, at 22-25.
41
E.g., United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1949) (“reasonable person” in tort law involves costbenefit balancing); People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207 (Col. 2000) (“reasonable person” in the criminal law involves costbenefit balancing).
35
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B. OIRA, Executive Order 12,866, and Cost-Benefit Analysis
The statutes described above are not the only legal constraint imposed upon OSHA and
the EPA. Under Executive Order 12,886, each federal agency must conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of any proposed regulation with an expected economic impact greater than $100
million.42 These cost-benefit analyses are reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), which has the authority to reject the regulation or return it to the agency for
further consideration.43 However, this constraint is entirely internal to the administration: no
outside group can sue an agency for failing to comply with an executive order, and of course no
executive order can override a statutory mandate.44
Agencies thus find themselves whipsawed. In a variety of cases, the EPA must regulate
under the terms of a statute that appears to call for feasibility analysis and an executive order that
demands cost-benefit analysis. If the EPA opts for a stringent regulation that may produce more
costs than benefits, it risks having the regulation rejected by OIRA; if EPA chooses a different
regulation that maximizes net benefits, it risks having that regulation challenged (by outside
groups) as incompatible with the agency’s statutory mandate. In theory, of course, OIRA’s
preference for cost-benefit analysis should give way when an alternate approach is mandated by
statute. In reality, however, OIRA and the EPA may have different interpretations of what,
precisely, a statute demands. In addition, the EPA may have some amount of interpretive
freedom under the familiar Chevron deference standard,45 which may lead OIRA to push the
EPA to exercise that interpretive authority by regulating pursuant to cost-benefit analysis.
Tension between Executive Order 12,866 and the plain language of many statutes is
unavoidable.
C. Judicial Interpretations
OSHA and the EPA have promulgated hundreds of regulations under the feasibilitybased statutes described above, and challenges to those regulations have reached the appellate
courts on dozens of occasions. Nearly every case involves either a claim by an environmental or
labor group that the agency has not regulated strictly enough, or a claim by a private firm or
industry group that it has regulated too strictly. The latter is frequently accompanied by an
42

Exec. Order 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C); § 3(f)(1) (1993).
Id. § 6(b); Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 1100 & nn. 16 & 17.
44
The executive orders state as much themselves. Exec. Order 12,866 § 1(a) (1993) (“Further, in choosing among
alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits . . . unless a
statute requires another regulatory approach.”); id. § 9 (“Nothing in this order shall be construed as displacing the
agencies' authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law.”); id. § 10 (“Nothing in this Executive order shall affect
any otherwise available judicial review of agency action. This Executive order is intended only to improve the
internal management of the Federal Government and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or
employees, or any other person.”).
45
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
43
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argument that the agency improperly failed to employ cost-benefit analysis; the former often
involves a claim that the agency illegally employed cost-benefit analysis. From this voluminous
record of judicial review, two important conclusions emerge.46
First, the federal courts—led by the Supreme Court—will not force agencies to use costbenefit analysis in regulating when the governing statute appears to trigger feasibility analysis.
For instance, in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, the Court held that
“to the extent feasible” language in the Occupational Safety and Health Act did not require
OSHA to conduct a cost-benefit analysis, validating a regulation that would not have led to
widespread financial problems but might also not have passed a cost-benefit test.47 In similar
fashion, courts of appeals have repeatedly upheld OSHA48 and EPA49 regulations governed by
“feasibility” or “best available technology” statutory language against arguments by industry
groups that those regulations are not cost-benefit justified. Courts have stated repeatedly that
those statutes do not obligate OSHA and the EPA to conduct cost-benefit analyses, and that a
failure to perform such analysis does not render the resulting regulations legally infirm.
Second, the EPA—and likely OSHA as well—is permitted to employ cost-benefit
analysis in lieu of feasibility analysis as an exercise of its discretion under Chevron. This appears
to be the case even for the most stringent of statutory standards. In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,
Inc.,50 decided in April 2009, the Supreme Court announced that the EPA could use cost-benefit
analysis when regulating under a section of the Clean Water Act that mandates use of the “best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”51 The Court held that the
agency’s decision was reasonable under Chevron,52 despite classifying the “best technology
available” provision as the most stringent statutory standard contained within the Clean Water
Act.53 And perhaps not surprisingly, the Court also suggested that (less stringent) statutory
46

Many of these cases take the form of hard look review challenges to the rationality behind the agency’s decision.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (announcing the standard for hard
look review). These types of challenges are necessarily highly fact specific, and we do not dwell on their minutiae
here. Rather, we are concerned with how the courts have treated arguments that agencies should or should not be
using cost-benefit analysis in the presence of statutes that appear to call for feasibility analysis.
47
452 U.S. 490 (1981).
48
Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975 (D.C.Cir.1991) (lead exposure standard); Public Citizen Health
Research Group v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 557 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2009) (chromium exposure standard); Kennecott
Greens Creek Mining Co. v. Mine Safety and Health Administration, 476 F.3d 946 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (diesel
particulate matter regulated under the Mine Act).
49
Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) (nitrous oxide regulation under a “best available
control technology” standard); Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 936 (5th Cir. 1998) (“In applying
the BAT standard, the EPA is not obligated to evaluate the reasonableness of the relationship between costs and
benefits.”); American Paper Institute v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (no requirement that EPA balance
costs and benefits under a “best available demonstrated control technology” standard); Heinzerling, supra note 2, at
1102 n. 32 (collecting cases).
50
129 S. Ct. 1498.
51
33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (emphasis added).
52
Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1510. It is worth noting that this portion of the Court’s opinion garnered six votes, with
Justice Breyer concurring. Id. at 1512.
53
Id. at 1507.
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sections requiring the EPA to select the “best available technology economically achievable” and
“best available demonstrated control technology” would similarly allow for regulation based on
cost-benefit analysis.54
In fact, so far as we are aware, no court of appeals has ever rejected an agency decision to
employ cost-benefit analysis as exceeding that agency’s interpretive authority under Chevron.
Courts of appeals have occasionally used strong language rejecting cost-benefit analysis as
“incompatible” with feasibility-based statutory provisions,55 but those statements came always in
the context of an agency decision not to perform cost-benefit analysis. Given the deference to
agency interpretation shown by the court in Entergy, it is difficult to believe that many
“feasibility”-based statutory sections will prohibit agencies from regulating on the basis of costbenefit analysis. Going forward, agencies may simply have the option of selecting between costbenefit analysis and feasibility analysis, with courts willing to approve either methodology.56
II. Feasibility Analysis in Practice
A. OSHA’S Chromium Regulation
1. Background and Health Effects
Hexavalent chromium, Cr (VI), is a predominantly manmade compound57 used in
approximately thirty major industries.58 It is used to produce alloys, such as stainless steel, which
are then often employed in welding or to form surface protection layers for plate metal and
plastic substrates.59 Cr (VI) compounds are also used as “ingredients and catalysts” in the
production of pigments and chemicals.60 However, Cr (VI) is known to cause lung cancer in
addition to lesser ailments such as asthma, dermatitis, nasal irritation, and gastrointestinal
ulcers.61
As of 2004, OSHA regulations set a maximum personal exposure level for workers
dealing with Cr (VI) of 52 μg/m3. This meant that workers could be exposed to a concentration
54

Id. (“It is not obvious to us that [the proposition that cost-benefit analysis is precluded under the BATEA and
BADT tests] is correct, but we need not pursue that point . . . .”).
55
Public Citizen, 557 F.3d at 177 (“We note that the Supreme Court has conclusively ruled that economic feasibility
does not involve a cost-benefit analysis.”).
56
It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine whether this statutory interpretation is correct in each and every
instance; our argument is principally that, if given the option, agencies should prefer cost-benefit analysis.
57
71 Fed. Reg. 10100, 10104 (2006).
58
Id. at 10108, 10227. OSHA estimated that Cr (VI) is used by approximately 52,000 individual businesses and
facilities. Id.
59
Id. at 10108.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 10108, 10166, 10174. Studies show that in addition to inhalation, “direct hand-to-nose contact” can also
result in these symptoms. Id. at 10170. In the course of examining the threat to worker health posed by Cr (VI),
OSHA determined that a “linear relative risk model”—according to which the health risk posed by Cr (VI) exposure
scales linearly with the amount to which a worker is exposed—best fit the available data. Id. at 10220.
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of chromium in the air they were breathing equal to 52 micrograms per cubic meter. OSHA
determined that lowering the allowable level of chromium exposure could prevent as many as
250 deaths per year.62 This triggered OSHA’s statutory obligation to “assure[], to the extent
feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.” 63
Accordingly, OSHA initiated rulemaking proceedings and set out to amend the existing
standard.64
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
As part of the regulatory process (and to comply with Executive Order 12,866), OSHA
undertook a cost-benefit analysis in which it examined a variety of possible regulatory standards
ranging from 0.25 μg/m3 to 20 μg/m3. OSHA estimated the number of fatal and non-fatal cancers
that could be prevented by imposing each of these exposure limits. (Other than a small additive
factor for cases of dermatitis,65 OSHA did not include any other non-cancer illnesses due to a
lack of data on the likelihood of those conditions and their costs.66) OSHA then monetized the
benefits of avoiding these cancers using the EPA standard valuation of $6.8 million per life
saved and a range of values for nonfatal cancers extending from $188,502 per cancer avoided
(the medical cost of treating such an illness) to $4 million (the best estimate of individuals’
willingness to pay to avoid a nonfatal case).67 OSHA then discounted the projected annual
monetized benefits to present value, performing one calculation using a rate of 3% and another
calculation with a 7% discount rate.68 Table 1 displays the results of OSHA’s cost-benefit
analysis.

62

Id. at 10221.
29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5).
64
The rule is set out in 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100, and was upheld by the third circuit, see Public Citizen Health Research
Group v. United States Department of Labor, 557 F.3d 165 (3rd Cir. 2009).
65
71 Fed. Reg. 10305, 07. Medical costs per case were estimated to be $119 and secondary costs $1,239. Id. at
10307. Based on an incidence of 0.2-1%, OSHA estimated 418-2,089 cases of dermatitis annually and presumed a
50% reduction to 209-1,045 cases. Id.
66
Id. at 10307.
67
Id. at 10305.
68
Id. at 10305 (Table VIII-11). The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) currently recommends that agencies
perform cost-benefit analysis using discount rates of both 3% and 7%. See Office of Management and Budget,
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, 57 Fed. Reg. at 53,520 (Nov. 10, 1992); OMB Circular A-4, 33-34
(September, 2003).
63

11

Table 1: OSHA Cr (VI) Cost-Benefit Analysis
Exposure Limit
0.25 μg/m3
0.5 μg/m3
Fatal Cancers
66 - 258
62 - 243
Avoided
Non-Fatal Cancers
9 - 35
8 – 33
Avoided
Monetized
Benefits (7%
$60 - 891
$57 - 841
discount rate)
Monetized
Benefits (3%
$189 – 1,587
$176 – 1,496
discount rate)
Total
$1,615
$1,033
Costs
Median Net Benefit
-$1,340
-$584
(7% discount rate)
Median Net Benefit
-$874
-$160
(3% discount rate)
Note: dollar figures refer to millions of 2003 dollars.

1 μg/m3

5 μg/m3

10 μg/m3

20 μg/m3

58 - 224

40 - 145

27 - 95

15 - 47

8 – 31

5 – 20

4 – 13

2-6

$53 - 776

$36 - 504

$25 - 328

$13 - 162

$164 –
1,382

$112 - 896

$77 - 584

$41 - 288

$570

$282

$170

$112

-$156

-$12

$6

-$24

$221

$231

$165

$56

As Table 1 shows, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the potential costs and
benefit of chromium regulation. Many of the high and low estimates of benefits are more than an
order of magnitude apart, and the choice of discount rate affected the calculations of benefits by
approximately a factor of two. (This is in addition to the fact that the cost-benefit analysis
incorporates only cancers and dermatitis and excludes other illnesses.) The cost-benefit analysis
nevertheless provides a significant amount of information. While the health consequences of
chromium exposure scale approximately linearly, the costs of complying with increasingly
stringent standards clearly do not. Rather, they increase exponentially as the regulatory standard
becomes stricter. For instance, the cost to industry of complying with a 5 μg/m3 exposure limit is
$112 million greater than the cost of complying with a 10 μg/m3 exposure limit, while the cost of
complying with a 0.25 μg/m3 limit is nearly $600 million greater than the cost of complying with
a 0.5 μg/m3 standard.
Accordingly, the 0.25 μg/m3 standard is not cost-benefit justified under any set of
assumptions, while the 0.5 μg/m3 standard is not cost-benefit justified under any but the most
optimistic assumptions. On the other hand, both the 5 μg/m3 and 10 μg/m3 standards would
produce greater net benefits than the 20 μg/m3 standard under nearly any set of assumptions.
OSHA’s cost-benefit analysis is thus helpful in narrowing the range of useful possibilities, even
taking into account the high degree of uncertainty involved. The socially optimal exposure limit
for Cr (VI) likely lies somewhere within the range of 1-10 μg/m3.
In its original notice of proposed rulemaking, OSHA suggested an exposure limit of 1
3 69
μg/m . When OSHA eventually published the final rule, the agency had revised its regulatory
69

69 Fed. Reg. 59306, 59448-49 (2004).
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goals and settled on an exposure limit of 5 μg/m3. OSHA never fully explained the reasons for
this change, and the ultimate rationale behind it remains unclear. However, OSHA may have
been under pressure from several fronts: it received a number of negative comments from
potentially regulated parties about the proposed 1 μg/m3 standard; a preliminary feasibility
analysis showed that such a stringent limitation might put several industries under significant
pressure (more on this later);70 and in addition OSHA may have been influenced by the costbenefit analysis outlined above.
3. Feasibility Analysis
Before promulgating a regulation setting a new exposure limit of 5 μg/m3, OSHA was of
course required to conduct a feasibility analysis. The Occupational Safety and Health Act does
not define “feasibility”—the specifics are left to the agency. Here, OSHA attached a particular
set of numerical values to that statutory standard. OSHA policy required that in order for a
regulation to be considered economically feasible—in the sense of avoiding widespread plant
closings—it must not cause revenue within an industry to decline by more than 1% or profits to
decline by more than 10%.71 (We refer to this as OSHA’s “1%/10% rule.”) However, OSHA
reserved the right to except industries from this standard under certain circumstances—to impose
regulations even though projected profit or revenue declines would exceed the 1%/10%
thresholds.
In order to conduct its feasibility analysis, OSHA surveyed 250 potentially affected
industries.72 The surveys asked businesses whether they used Cr (VI) as part of normal business
operations and, if so, what proportion of those operations involved potential chromium exposure.
Pursuant to these surveys, OSHA identified nine industries where the costs of complying with
the proposed 5 μg/m3 standard were expected to exceed 1% of revenues, and an additional
twenty-two where costs were expected to exceed 10% of profits (but revenue loss would be less
than 1%).73 We list these industries and their projected profit and revenue losses in Table A2 in
the Appendix. However, OSHA ascertained that nineteen of the thirty-one substantially affected
industries were “plating or welding industries where actual plating or welding are exceedingly
rare.”74 As a result, OSHA concluded that it would be improper to extrapolate from the responses
of one or a few businesses to the entire industry, as it typically does in the course of a feasibility
analysis.75 Either those businesses were outliers, and the chromium regulation would not
70

See 71 Fed. Reg. 10100, 10301-10302 (rejecting the more stringent regulation in part due to the fact that the
electroplating industry would suffer profit losses of approximately 65%).
71
Id. at 10281.
72
The federal government classifies industries according to the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS), created by OMB to standardize the collection and analysis of industry-wide data. See id. at 10271-79
(Table VIII-7). For details on the NAICS, see http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/.
73
Id. at 10300.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 10300-10301.
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significantly harm the industry, or the business may have checked an incorrect box on OSHA’s
survey.76 OSHA disregarded the effects of chromium regulation in those cases.77
That left twelve industries that OSHA conceded would be affected beyond the 1%/10%
threshold.78 Even in the face of these twelve violations of its 1%/10% rule, OSHA elected to
proceed with the regulation. The agency justified its waiver of the 1%/10% standard with respect
to these industries according to a variety of arguments:
• In several cases, OSHA decided that demand for the chromium-related product was
highly inelastic and concluded that affected firms would be able to pass compliance costs
directly along to consumers, saving the firms from closing. The fact that consumers
would then bear these costs was not part of the analysis.79 OSHA also did not address
foreign competition; if foreign firms do not bear the cost of regulation, then domestic
firms cannot pass on compliance costs to consumers.
• OSHA classified other industries—typically welding industries geared around machinery
repair—as primarily “service” industries. It concluded that overseas competition was not
a real concern for these industries, and thus that demand was relatively inelastic.80 This is
a non sequitur; demand could certainly be elastic even without direct foreign competition.
• In other cases, OSHA concluded similarly that the products and services being produced
were in high demand within the American market or constituted an irreplaceable link in a
larger market chain. 81 OSHA’s unstated view must have been that demand would be
relatively inelastic, though here again the possibility of foreign competitors went
unmentioned.
• OSHA excepted several industries on the ground that they had recently absorbed profit
fluctuations or price increases greater than those expected from the new regulation.82 The
fact that fluctuations in profits are not the same as guaranteed declines in profits was
apparently lost on the agency.
• Finally, OSHA excepted several other industries because alternatives to Cr (VI) or
cheaper emission control technologies existed and could be easily substituted. This
rationale amounts to a claim that costs were simply not as high as OSHA had estimated in
its own feasibility analysis.83
We summarize these explanations, as applied to the relevant industries, in Table A2 of
the Appendix, and we provide a sampling of them here.

76

Id.
Id.
78
Id. at 10301-302.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 10302.
77
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Table 2: Selected Results of OSHA’s Feasibility Analysis
Industry

Compliance
Costs as a
Percentage of
Revenue
Electroplating – General Industry
Electroplating, Plating,
1.24%
Polishing Anodizing and
Coloring Services
(NAICS 332813)

Compliance
Costs as a
Percentage of
Profits

Explanation of Deviation from Screening

30.15%

Sells service not product, so overseas competition
shouldn’t be strong. Electroplating is “essential to
the manufacture of most plated products,”
implying that demand is unlikely to decrease.
Experienced and survived profit variation of up to
49% in single year. 1.24% price increase is
“significantly less than the average annual increase
in price.” Demand is inelastic because plating just
a component of product’s total cost (less than
0.5%).
71 Fed. Reg. 10301

Welding – Construction Industry (Stainless Steel)
Building, Developing,
0.92%
22.33%
and General
Contracting; Heavy
Construction; Special
Trade Contractors
(NAICS 233, 234, 235)
Painting – General Industry
Used Car Dealers
0.41%
33.66%
(NAICS 44112)

Automotive Body, Paint, 1.50%
and Interior Repair and
Maintenance (NAICS
811121)
Chromium Catalyst Producers
All Other Basic
0.80%
Inorganic Chemical
Manufacturers (NAICS
325188)

Passing costs on would only increase price 0.92%
and steel prices have varied more than 10% a year
without affecting the industry.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302

Cr (VI) alternatives already exist, the use of Cr
(VI) is only a small portion of the actual business,
and demand is probably fairly inelastic.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302
Cr (VI) alternatives are already developed, the use
of Cr (VI) is only a small portion of the actual
business, and demand is probably fairly inelastic.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302

39.16%

27.14%

Short-term demand is relatively inelastic since
most companies would need major new
investments to shift away from CR(VI) catalysts.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302

As an initial matter, it is possible to draw several conclusions from the manner in which
OSHA conducted this feasibility analysis. First, OSHA’s stated 1%/10% rule operated as only a
weak constraint. OSHA overrode its general rule in a dozen instances, including several cases in
which industries were expected to suffer profit losses greater than 20%. These deviations would
seem a great deal more arbitrary were it not for the arbitrariness of the 1%/10% rule itself.
OSHA made no serious attempt to justify that standard, nor—more importantly—did it tie it to
the D.C. Circuit’s standard for feasibility: that the regulation not threaten “the existence or
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competitive structure of an industry.”84 The ease with which OSHA accepted multiple deviations
from its 1%/10% rule seems to imply that the agency did not view its own standard as a
constraint.
Second, OSHA’s exceptions to the 1%/10% are neither well reasoned nor well
documented. OSHA provides little explanation for its broad conclusions about major industries,
and (as noted above) at certain points its claims seem to skip over important logical links. This is
in addition to the fact that many of OSHA’s rationales—perhaps all of them—actually amounted
to claims that profits in an industry would not decrease by the proportion OSHA expected.
OSHA’s claim that it had excepted industries from the 1%/10% rule is not precisely correct; in
fact, OSHA simply contravened its own findings. In many cases OSHA may well be correct to
adjust its own results, but the ease with which standard assessments of lost profits and lost
revenues were discarded speaks poorly of the reliability of those numbers in the first place. On
the whole, OSHA’s exceptions have the air of post hoc rationalizations: having decided to
regulate, OSHA appears to have simply done the paperwork necessary to clear a few formal
obstacles.
Finally, it is entirely conceivable that OSHA’s feasibility analysis led the agency to select
a suboptimal level of regulation—though not for the reasons that feasibility analysis is typically
criticized. Industry groups frequently attack feasibility analysis for enabling more stringent
regulation than they deem appropriate.85 Here, however, feasibility analysis may well have led
OSHA to opt for too weak a regulatory standard, from a social welfare perspective. On a
plausible set of assumptions,86 a 1 μg/m3 exposure limit actually produces greater net benefits
than a 5 μg/m3 exposure limit. Recall that OSHA initially considered setting the exposure limit at
1 μg/m3, only to discard it in favor of a more relaxed standard in part because a preliminary
feasibility analysis indicated that at least one industry might suffer losses great enough to
threaten its survival.87 It is difficult to understand why one or two industries ought to hold
effective veto rights over a regulation that might substantially benefit workers in numerous other
segments of the economy, but feasibility analysis—at least as performed by OSHA—invites
precisely this result.
B. EPA’s Paper Mill Regulation
1. Background
Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills discharge hazardous chemicals into the water and
hazardous pollutants into the air. The discharges into the water sicken and kill fish and may
cause harm, including cancer, to humans who eat those fish. The emissions into the air cause
84

United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1272.
This is in many cases a valid criticism, and one we take up in later sections.
86
Those assumptions are a 3% discount rate and benefits nearer the higher end of the possible range.
87
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
85
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cancer, other diseases (such as respiratory disease), unwanted symptoms (such as headaches),
and bad smells.88 In 1998, EPA issued a new rule that revised and updated earlier rules
regulating this industry pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act.89 To keep our exposition as simple as possible, we will focus on the effluent limitations—
the regulations governing the discharge of waste into bodies of water. These limitations were
applied to mills that used a particular wood pulp production process in which wood chips are
dissolved in caustic soda or sodium sulfide (the bleached papergrade kraft and soda category),
and to mills that used related sulfite-based processes (the papergrade sulfite category).90 Ninetysix such mills were in operation in the United States at the time of the regulation.91
Under the Clean Water Act, different standards apply to different types of regulated
activity, depending (for example) on whether a facility existed prior to regulation or not, whether
discharges are direct or indirect, and the nature and toxicity of the pollutant. In the context of
paper mill regulation, all of these possibilities arise, and hence EPA in principle was required to
regulate under multiple standards—best practicable control technology currently available, best
conventional pollutant control technology, best available technology economically achievable,
among others—with presumably the strictest prevailing.92 EPA considered three regulatory
options under the best available technology standard, with the aim of limiting or removing
chlorine from the production process, of which cancer-causing dioxin and furan are byproducts.
“Option A” required the mills to substitute chlorine dioxide for elemental chlorine in the
production process, which reduces but does not eliminate the discharge of dioxin and furan.
“Option B” was a stricter rule, involving the Option A limits plus delignification (the removal of
lignin, a material in wood pulp) and other restrictions on the manufacturing process. The effect
would be to reduce the discharge of dioxin and furan still further but not eliminate it. “Option
TCF,” stricter still, required the complete elimination of all chlorine from the production process,
which would eliminate discharge of furan and dioxin.93
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Pulp mills rarely discharge waste into commercial fisheries. Commercially distributed
fish caught where waste is discharged are not numerous and are distributed widely, and so
constitute an insignificant portion of the average consumer’s diet. Accordingly, EPA considered
only the health effects for recreational and subsistence anglers. Before regulation, between 0.83
and 2.76 statistical lives were lost per year as a result of the paper mill discharges. Option A
88

Final Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards for the
Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,585-87 (April 15, 1998).
89
Id. The regulation was upheld by the D.C. Circuit. See National Wildlife Federation v. EPA, 286 F.3d 554 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
90
http://www.insights.co.nz/products_processes_pp.aspx.
91
63 Fed. Reg. at 18,505.
92
See id. at 18,513-14.
93
Id. at 18,541-43.
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would reduce annual statistical deaths by 0.73-2.41, and Option B would reduce annual statistical
deaths by 0.75-2.50. To monetize these figures, EPA used very broad ranges for the value of a
statistical life (between $2.5 and $9 million). The highest possible benefit was accordingly $21.7
million per year under Option A and $22.5 million per year under Option B.94 In a separate
“sensitivity analysis,” EPA estimated that Option TCF would reduce statistical cancer deaths by
0.83 to 2.76 per year—thus eliminating the entire pre-regulation risk of death—providing a
potential benefit of up to $25.2 million.95
EPA also stated that the regulations would reduce risk of non-cancer illnesses but (like
OSHA) did not report monetary estimates because of inadequate data.96 Further, by reducing the
amount of dioxin in fisheries, the regulations would reduce the number of dioxin-related fish
advisories and hence would increase the number of anglers who would be able to use those
fisheries. EPA valued this benefit at $2 to $20 million per year for both Option A and Option
B.97 Increased participation of anglers would add another $4.7 to $15.5 million per year, but
because of uncertainties EPA did not end up including these figures in its benefit estimate.98
Finally, the ability to use cheaper sludge disposal methods would save another $8 to $16 million
per year.99 Option TCF would have the same effect.100 Aggregate benefits were $11.9-$57.1
million for Option A, $12-$57.9 million for Option B,101 and $12.1-$60.6 million for Option
TCF.102
EPA estimated compliance costs of approximately $262 million per year for Option A,
$324 million for Option B, and $1.01 billion for Option TCF.103 It did not calculate aggregate
present values for the benefits and costs for each option,104 but quite clearly they were negative,
especially because capital costs would occur in the near term and many of the benefits, such as
avoided cancer deaths, would be enjoyed only in the long term. Of the three options, Option A is
the least bad, reducing social wealth by, on average, only about $200 million per year (assuming
benefits at the maximum of the range).
The effluent regulation is not the whole story, however. As noted earlier, the rule
combined both effluent and emission regulations under the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act,
and the EPA integrated the cost-benefit analyses of both sets of regulations. The reason for this is
that Options B and TCF would produce hazardous emissions that would require further controls
94

Economic Analysis, Table 8-6. The normal value of life is $6 million. EPA also calculated the effect of the
options on the Native American angler population but because the numbers are so small and uncertain, and EPA
omitted them from its analysis. See id. at p. 8-14.
95
Id. at p. 8-45.
96
Id. at p. 8-14.
97
Id. at p. 8-23; Table 8-12.
98
Id. at p. 8-23; Table 8-12.
99
Id. at p. 8-25.
100
Id. at p. 8-45.
101
Id. at Table 8-12.
102
Id. at Table 8-21.
103
Id. at Tables 5-16, 5-18.
104
EPA does report present values for the integrated rules, including emissions limitations. See Table 10-2.
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under the Clean Air Act. The combined annual benefits for Option A ranged between –$727
million [sic]105 and $1.5 billion, while the combined annual costs were $420 million—more or
less a wash if we take the midpoint of the benefits. Table 3 provides a summary of the analysis.
Table 3: Pulp and Paper Regulation: Costs and Benefits of Options106

Capital Costs
Operation and
Management Costs
Pre-Tax Annualized
Costs
Total Annual
Monetized Benefits
Net Benefits

Option A
Final Rule
w/CAA
Individually
Rule
$1,039
$1, 394

Rules
Option B
Alternate Rule #1
w/CAA
Individually
Rule
$2,203
$2,694

Option TCF
Alternate Rule #2
w/CAA
Individually
Rule
$3,159
$3,650

$158

$211

$94

$163

$790

$859

$263

$351

$324

$442

$1,096

$1,215

($738.5) ($738.4) ($738.3) $12.0 - $57.9
$12.1 - $60.6
$1,496
$1,497
$1,496
($250.9) ($1,090) ($312.0) ($1,181) ($1,084) ($1,953) ($205.7)
$1,144
(266.1)
$1,054
($1.0359)
$282.1
Note: All dollar amounts are in millions of 1995 dollars. Amounts that are surrounded by parentheses are negative.
EPA used a 7% discount rate in all of their calculations. Costs were probably annualized over a 30 year period, with
capital costs being double counted in both the first and twenty-first years, and annual operation and management
$11.9 - $57.1

costs counted every year after the first.

3. Feasibility Analysis
EPA did not explicitly refer to feasibility analysis, but it conducted what it called an
analysis of “economic impact” that resembles OSHA’s feasibility analysis for the chromium
rule, albeit without the compliance thresholds.
First, EPA examined mill closures. Ninety-six mills would be affected by the regulation.
Of these, one would be closed under Option A, two under Option B, and seven under Option
TCF.107 EPA made these estimates on the basis of accounting data reported by the firms. If the
cost of compliance would be greater than the profits generated by a particular mill, then that mill
would close. OSHA, by contrast, looked directly at the impact on profits.
Second, EPA examined job loss. The industry employed 90,840 workers. EPA estimated
that 400 jobs would be lost under Option A, 900 under Option B, and 7,100 under Option

105

Negative benefits are possible because the emissions regulation replaces some hazardous emissions with other
hazardous emissions; under certain conditions, the latter emissions could cause more harm. Id. at 4-7.
106
This table is compiled from data in the EPA's regulatory impact analysis for the National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines,
Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category; Final Rule,
63 Fed. Reg. 18504, pages 3-2, 4-23, and Tables 5-16, 5-18, 8-12, 8-13, and 8-21.
107
Economic Analysis, Table 6-4, 6-19.
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TCF.108 These jobs refer to those of workers in firms that would be shut down. EPA also noted
that 5,700 jobs would be lost in aggregate under Option A—including job losses in mills that are
not shut down but suffer a loss in demand—but did not provide comparable figures for Options
B and TCF.109
Third, EPA considered bankruptcies of firms. Thirty-seven firms would be affected by
the regulation. EPA estimated that no publicly owned firms would be bankrupted under Option
A, and more than one would be bankrupted under Options B. The estimate was based on an
algorithm that uses accounting data as inputs and generates a probability that the firm will enter
bankruptcy. EPA did not perform this analysis for Option TCF but reasoned that it would
bankrupt at least as many firms as Option B.110
As noted, EPA, unlike OSHA, did not set a compliance threshold for revenue or
profit loss, or plant closings in general. It simply reported this information without comment.
Table 4 provides a summary. Table 4 also includes the feasibility analysis for the integrated
regulation that includes emissions standards. These standards applied to a greater number of
mills, jobs, and firms, and those figures are included in the table.
Table 4: Pulp and Paper Regulation: Economic Impacts of Options111

Mill Closures / Mills
Job Losses from Mill
Closures
Baseline: 90,840
Firm Failures / Firms

Option A
Final Rule
w/CAA
Individually
Rule
1/96
2/158

Rules
Option B
Alternate Rule #1
w/CAA
Individually
Rule
2/96
4/158

Option TCF
Alternate Rule #2
w/CAA
Individually
Rule
7/96
9/158

400

900

900

4,800

7,100

10,200

0/37

0/52

>1/37

>1/52

>1/37

>1/52

EPA concluded on the basis of this analysis that Option A was “economically
achievable,” and that Option B and Option TCF were not.112
The question, then, is why Option A satisfied the feasibility test. Is it because a regulation
that causes the closure of only one of 96 mills is “feasible”? Or is the relevant issue job loss or
bankruptcy? And where is the line to be drawn? EPA said that seven mill closures and 7,100 job
losses made Option TCF infeasible without considering firm failures.113 What if these numbers
108

Id. at Table 6-4, 6-19.
Id.
110
Id. at 6-6.
111
This table is compiled from data in the EPA's regulatory impact analysis for the National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Category Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations Guidelines,
Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Category; Final Rule,
63 Fed. Reg. 18504, pages 2-3, 2-29, and 6-4 to -6, and Tables 6-4, 6-5, and 6-19.
112
63 Fed. Reg. at 18,550, 18,584. However, Option B was chosen for new sources.
113
63 Fed. Reg. at 18,584.
109
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were incrementally lower? More puzzles arise when one considers the integrated regulation
options. Now Option A shuts down two mills and eliminates 900 jobs. How does one determine
whether these extra harms are justified by the additional benefits from the emissions limits? In
addition, mill closures (2) and job losses (900) are the same under the unachievable Option B by
itself and the integrated Option A. The only difference is the lack of firm failure. EPA said that
failures are “particularly problematic,”114 but did not elaborate. In addition, EPA has issued other
rules despite the fact that they caused firm failures.115 Does it matter what size the firm is?
Shouldn’t it matter? Since mills employ different numbers of worker (400 at the most vulnerable
mill, 500 at the second most, and then 3,900 at the third and fourth most vulnerable mills
combined, or 1,900 at each on average), a larger mill could easily employ more workers and
produce more paper than a smaller firm.
Whatever feasibility analysis’s ambiguities, it is clear about one thing: losses to consumer
welfare do not play a role in the test. Because EPA nonetheless performed an analysis of the
effect of the rules, we can see the consequence of this approach. EPA estimated that Option A
would increase the cost of paper products for people with incomes under $10,000 from 2.09 to
2.13 percent of pre-tax income, in aggregate $26.1 million.116 The losses to the general public
would be much higher, of course, as reflected in the cost-benefit analysis—although, ideally, a
cost-benefit analysis would also monetize the benefits that EPA omitted.
III. The Problems With Feasibility Analysis
A. The Economic Consequences of Feasibility Analysis
1. A Framework
As we have noted, feasibility analysis comes in different formulations. We will focus on
OSHA’s because of its precision, but our analysis applies to others as well, and we will briefly
address EPA’s approach. OSHA’s feasibility analysis proceeds as follows:
1. Identify a workplace that is unsafe.117
2. Define the relevant industry or industries.
3. Determine the technologically feasible (that is, available) measures that can reduce or
eliminate the risk.
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4. Require firms in the industry to adopt these measures unless the cost of doing so would
cause widespread plant closings or (in OSHA’s formulation)
a. Reduce industry profits by more than ten percent; or
b. Reduce industry revenues by more than one percent.
Analysts refer to step 3 as the technological feasibility requirement and step 4 as the economic
feasibility requirement. Step 1 is straightforward; we evaluate steps 2 through 4 below.
2. Industry
Feasibility analysis requires some definition of industry because the technological
feasibility requirement typically refers to technologies used in the industry being regulated, and
the economic feasibility requirement refers to plant closings within that industry. But how is the
relevant industry determined? We have had trouble finding an answer to this question in the
regulations and case law, but we can at least explain why the definition of industry matters, and
what is at stake.
Imagine that substance X causes harm to workers who are exposed to it. Industry 1 uses
substance X to paint cars. Industry 2 uses substance X to paint aircraft. A technologically
feasible regulation would require employers to supply workers with respirators at the cost of
(say) $500 per worker.
It is easy to see that this identical regulation might cause widespread plant closing in one
industry but not another. Industry 1 (let us suppose) faces elastic demand. If firms supply
respirators and raise prices, they lose customers. Plants that had been justified by economies of
scale are shut down and workers lose jobs. Industry 2 faces inelastic demand. Firms pass on the
costs to consumers and demand remains constant. No plants close.
If Industries 1 and 2 are treated separately for purpose of feasibility analysis, then
regulations will mandate respirators only in Industry 2, not in Industry 1. If Industries 1 and 2 are
treated as the same industry—the industrial consumer-products painting industry—then the
agency would need to determine whether the respirator rule would cause widespread plant
closures in the whole industry that combines 1 and 2. Using OSHA’s chromium approach, this
would involve determining whether the regulation reduces revenues by one percent and profits
by ten percent for the joint industry. If so, the respirator rule is imposed, and car-painting plants
are shut down. If not, the respirator rule is not imposed. It is clear that whether respirators are
used thus depends on a rather arbitrary notion of how broadly the industry is defined.
Industries do not come in natural kinds. Any industry can be subdivided indefinitely. In
our Industry 1, closer examination might reveal that some firms paint cars and boats, while other
firms paint only cars. The firms in each sub-industry could have different cost structures, so that
if we applied the feasibility test to each sub-industry, one sub-industry would pass the test and
the other would not. Then it could turn out that, among firms that paint cars and boats, some
provide high-end work, while others provide low-end work; some do custom work, while others
do mass-produced work; some serve a particular region; some export and others do not; and so
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on, until each firm belongs to its own “industry.” Feasibility analysis would then simply require
firms that are large (their revenues are high) and profitable to adopt the safety precautions, while
smaller and poorer firms would not.
One might try to define industry in light of the purpose of feasibility analysis. But it is not
clear what the purpose of that test is. If the purpose is to permit regulation up to the point of
significant job loss, then one should not use an industry definition at all. The relevant
consideration would be the total number of lost jobs, regardless of which industry from which
they disappear. Another possible purpose is to protect workers with industry-specific skills—
skills that can be applied to one type of production process and not others. Workers with such
skills who lose their jobs may not be able to find jobs in another industry. On this theory, plant
shutdowns scattered across industries are less troublesome than those concentrated in a single
industry, even if the total number of jobs lost is the same. If this is the purpose of feasibility
analysis, then industries should be defined with reference to the transferability of skills. Another
possible purpose is to avoid substantial job losses in a single region, on the theory that workers
are not highly geographically mobile. If this is the purpose of feasibility analysis, then industries
should be defined with reference to geography.
That is not how agencies define industries. Instead, they use the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS).118 The Office of Management and Budget developed NAICS in
order to regularize statistical reporting by government agencies. NAICS divides industries into
more than a thousand six-digit codes. Classification is based on the similarity of production
processes.119 Consider the following example:120
333311 Automatic Vending Machine Manufacturing
333312 Commercial Laundry, Drycleaning, and Pressing Machine Manufacturing
333313 Office Machinery Manufacturing
333314 Optical Instrument and Lens Manufacturing
333315 Photographic and Photocopying Equipment Manufacturing
333319 Other Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing
A firm that manufacturers vending machines and a firm that manufactures pressing machines
belong to different industries because the production processes are different. A firm that
manufacturers computers and a firm that manufactures fax machines belong to the same industry
because their production processes are similar. But the similarity or difference of production
processes is not the same thing as the substitutability of jobs. An assembly-line worker, or
custodian, or security guard could probably work in any of these firms. And of course these
classifications say essentially nothing about geography. Another government classification

118

See, e.g., 71 Fed. Reg. 10100, 10337 (OSHA); 67 Fed. Reg. 3370, 3370 (EPA).
See http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/faqs/faqs.html#q1.
120
Taken from U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 NAICS Definition, available at http://www.census.gov/cgibin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart_code=31&search=2007%20NAICS%20Search.
119

23

system divides up occupations according to their similarity, but agencies do not use that
system.121
This is a problem if the purpose of economic feasibility is to prevent regulations from
harming workers by eliminating their jobs. A regulation that completely eliminated office
machinery manufacturing would have little impact on employment if workers can easily find
jobs in other commercial and service industry machinery manufacturing. Accordingly, the fact of
widespread plant closures in an industry reveals little about the regulation’s impact on workers.
Agencies appear to be aware of this problem, which they address by tinkering with
industry classifications on an ad hoc basis.122 This means that whether a regulation turns out to
be economically feasible or not is essentially a discretionary judgment by the agency.
It is worth noting that agencies may elect to alter (or scrap) a regulation entirely rather
than exempt certain industries from otherwise general rules. For instance, if a regulation as
applied to some industry would be infeasible per OSHA’s 1%/10% rule, OSHA may elect to
either except that industry from the 1%/10% rule and apply the regulation anyway or scrap the
regulation. This is effectively what happened in the chromium case: the 1 microgram standard
looked as though it would do too much damage to one industry, so OSHA scrapped it in favor of
a 5 micro-gram standard and then applied that standard to all industries despite the fact that some
of them almost certainly would not suffer substantial revenue or profit loss under the 1
microgram standard. Infeasibility in one industry may act as an effective veto of regulation of
other industries.
3. Technological Feasibility
Technological feasibility generally means technological availability. For example,
suppose that industrial practices cause certain inhalable toxins to enter the air. The agency may
consider ordering firms to adopt measures that are already technologically possible—for
example, ventilation fans or respirators that are already used by firms (though not necessarily
those in the industry).123 Although some commentators believe that agencies may issue
“technology-forcing” regulations—regulations that oblige firms to develop new, more effective
technologies—in practice courts have placed a heavy burden on agencies to prove that such
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technologies can indeed be developed, and as a result agencies rarely issue technology-forcing
regulations.124
Thus, the relevant “cost” for purposes of determining economic feasibility is the cost of
adopting available technology for the purpose of reducing or eliminating a risk. Presumably, the
most restrictive technology must be used, consistent only with economic feasibility. An agency
can also reduce the risk to zero simply by banning the production process that causes the risk.
For example, if a toxin is used in painting cars, the agency could order the firm not to use the
toxin—again subject to the economic feasibility rule. Option TCF (“totally chlorine free”) for the
paper mill regulation did just this.
The consequence is that the agency must choose between mandating safety precautions
that already exist or banning the substance altogether. But banning the substance altogether
would always be worse than demanding technological innovation that renders it harmless, given
that firms would always retain the option of discontinuing use of the substance if such innovation
would be too expensive.
The effect of the technological feasibility condition is not only to protect firms from
regulations that might drive them out of business (because they cannot develop a new technology
in cost-justified fashion), but also to entrench old technologies.125 Although feasibility analysis
does not eliminate firms’ existing incentives to develop safety precautions that are cheaper than,
but just as effective as, existing safety precautions, it does not enhance these incentives. The
reason is that feasibility analysis gives firms no incentive to take into account the costs they
impose on third parties. In fact, firms have incentives to avoid developing new technologies.
Newer, more effective technologies might make otherwise infeasible regulations feasible,
allowing agencies to impose additional regulation.
4. Economic Feasibility
In OSHA’s formulation, economic feasibility exists when two conditions are satisfied:
the cost of the safety technology is less than ten percent of profits, and the cost is less than one
percent of revenues. Commentators have generally interpreted feasibility in terms of plant
closures, which were also the focus of EPA’s paper mill regulation. We will address each of
these approaches.
Revenues. It is straightforward that the revenue component of the feasibility rule
introduces a market distortion in favor of small firms, that is, firms with low revenues, compared
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to large firms.126 To see why, suppose that the technologically feasible safety precaution in the
car-painting industry is the installation of a ventilation system. Suppose that one firm does highend work, with high revenues and high costs, and another firm does low-end work, with low
revenues and low costs—but are otherwise identical. Suppose that the first firm has revenues of
$10 million and the second firm has revenues of $1 million, and that the ventilation system costs
$50,000. If the firms are defined as belonging to different industries, then only the first firm must
install the ventilation system. If the firms are defined as belonging to the same industry, then
both firms must either install the system or not install the system, depending on the overall cost
structure of the industry. Yet there is no reason to make the ventilation system depend on the size
of the firm.
Firms become large to exploit economies of scale. A rule that systematically disfavors
large firms discourages firms from becoming large in the first place. The loss of economies of
scale will drive up costs, hurting consumers and shareholders, without producing any offsetting
benefits.
It is possible that, in some industries, the revenue rule is harmless because the costs of
safety precautions increase with revenue. Suppose, for example, that the technologically feasible
precaution is for workers to use respirators, and that higher revenue firms have more workers. In
this case, the revenue rule does not create an inefficiency because larger firms do not suffer
relative to small firms. However, there is no reason to believe this relationship holds in all cases.
Profits. The profit component of the economic feasibility rule protects low-profit
industries from regulation. To understand the economic effect of such a rule, we need to
understand why some industries enjoy higher profits than others. There are a few possibilities.
First, the higher-profit industry might face a higher level of risk, and investors demand the higher
profits to compensate them for taking on this extra level of risk. If this is the case, then
regulations that disfavor higher-profit firms will simply reduce their profits and cause investors
to flee. Despite the apparent small impact of the regulation on profits (that is, less than ten
percent), firms will close or otherwise reduce their risk-taking activity. The effect will be felt as
lower returns for shareholders in the short run, but as higher costs for consumers or the
elimination of desirable goods in the long run.
Second, some firms enjoy short-term profits because their managers spot market
opportunities that competitors miss. The short-term profits thus serve as a signal of unexploited
demand, attracting capital and eventually driving down prices, to the benefit of consumers. The
profit rule is simply a tax on such profits, which will reduce incentives to exploit these
opportunities. Consumers lose as a result.
Third, the higher-profit industry may benefit from natural or artificial market restrictions,
such as economies of scale, regulations, or illegal anticompetitive behavior. In the last case, the
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profit rule will reduce the profits of firms without having any negative effect, assuming that the
rents enjoyed by investors are greater than one percent of the total return. At the same time, the
profit rule may interact in undesirable ways with other areas of the law. Intellectual property law
grants firms limited monopolies in order to encourage innovation, yet these firms become
vulnerable under the feasibility test. Antitrust law is the proper method for policing
anticompetitive behavior; a rule that generally penalizes high-profit firms would be in tension
with antitrust law’s more nuanced approach.
Plants, Jobs, and Firms. Why does OSHA consider revenues and profits? An alternative
approach, illustrated by EPA’s paper mill regulation, is to determine whether a regulation closes
plants, destroys jobs, or bankrupts firms. Scholarly defenders of feasibility analysis also focus on
plant closures, job losses, and bankruptcies.127 Which is the right standard for feasibility?
These standards are obviously not the same. A regulation that reduces the revenues of an
industry does not necessarily reduce its profits. The regulation could cause some firms to shut
down, resulting in greater business for other firms and generating rents for them in the short run.
A regulation could also reduce profits without reducing revenues just by increasing costs. OSHA
requires both conditions to be satisfied, but why exactly? What is so important about revenues
and profits? One might think that OSHA seeks to protect the capitalists, not the workers.
Revenues and profits could be proxies for plant shutdowns. If revenues and profits
decline, then plants may be shut down and jobs lost. But revenues and profits could decline
without any plants being shut down: the regulation could just cause firms to fire workers while
keeping plants open with smaller staffs. In any event, why use proxies if the real concern is plant
closings or job loss? Agencies can estimate these outcomes directly—EPA did just this in the
paper mill regulation—and evaluate regulations’ feasibility on the basis of them.
But plant closures and job loss are not the same thing, either. A regulation that causes
plant closures could have no effect on job loss if firms just reassign workers to plants that remain
open. Or consider a regulation that shuts one out of 50 plants, with the result that 100 jobs are
lost, and a regulation that shuts zero plants but causes 10 job losses in all 50 plants, for a total of
500 job losses. Should the agency focus on plant closings (perhaps because of the effect on the
community) or job losses (because in the end this is what matters)? Workers are harmed when
they lose jobs, and people in the surrounding community could be hurt if job losses are
concentrated in one plant. Plant closings might be thought of as a proxy for job losses, but
agencies are capable of estimating job losses directly; EPA did this as well. There is no need to
employ any sort of proxy.
Finally, should agencies instead interpret feasibility to refer to bankruptcies? Consider an
industry with 50 plants. One firm owns 49 plants and another firm owns one plant. If a regulation
bankrupts the first firm, the consequences might seem more serious than if it bankrupts the
second firm, because the first firm owns more plants. On the other hand, bankruptcy does not
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force firms to shut down plants they own. If the plants remain profitable, the firms will just sell
them, and no one will lose a job. If that is the case, why restrict regulation to avoid bankruptcy?
These different rules would cause firms to act in different ways, none good. If firms
anticipate that agencies will spare them from regulation when necessary to minimize plant
shutdowns, then they will invest in larger numbers of smaller plants. If agencies spare firms
when necessary to minimize bankruptcy, then firms will maintain thin capitalizations by
distributing dividends to a greater extent than they would otherwise. If agencies spare firms
when necessary to minimize job loss, then firms will overhire. Of course, if the regulations have
only limited effect, then these distortions will be only marginal, but by the same token the
regulations will do little good.
Path-Dependency and Time-Inconsistency. Suppose that an industry produces hazardous
emissions that kill ten people per year. The industry has revenues of $1 million, costs of
$900,000, and profits of $100,000. Under some versions of the feasibility approach, EPA should
choose a level of regulation that reduces emissions to the maximum extent consistent with
avoiding widespread plant shutdowns or bankruptcies. Let us stipulate that a regulation X that
costs $90,000 would save 9 lives and avoid shutdowns and bankruptcies, leaving the industry as
a whole with profits of $10,000.
Next year, scientists discover that this same industry emits another hazardous substance.
This substance kills 100 people per year. A regulation Y that costs $50,000 would save 99 of
these people but would also bankrupt the industry, which now has profits of only $10,000.
Accordingly, feasibility analysis would forbid the agency from promulgating this regulation.
If scientists had discovered the second substance first, EPA could have issued regulation
Y, which saves more people at lower cost than regulation X does. This path dependence reflects
another form of arbitrariness that feasibility analysis produces. By contrast, cost-benefit analysis
would require either or both regulations to be issued, regardless of the order in which they are
introduced, as long as they are cost-justified (and regardless of whether they bankrupt the
industry).128
Agencies can reduce the risk of path dependency by refusing to issue regulations that
consume a large portion of an industry’s profits. As we have seen, OSHA will not issue
regulations that reduce profits by more than ten percent. In this case, path dependence will result
only if OSHA issues at least nine regulations that amount to more than ninety percent of profits.
But the price of avoiding the risk of path dependence is high. OSHA must refrain from issuing
cost-justified regulations that produce high costs but even higher benefits.
5. Summary
We can put the pieces of our analysis together. According to economic analysis, a firm
should engage in a precaution when the marginal benefits (in terms of reduced risk of harm to
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workers and others) exceed the marginal costs. Feasibility analysis deviates from this approach.
We can divide the deviations into two categories—cases where feasibility analysis results in
underregulation (relative to economic optimality) and cases where it results in overregulation.129
As before, we focus on OSHA’s approach.

•
•
•

•
•

Feasibility analysis results in underregulation of industrial sectors where:
A low-cost precaution technology can be cheaply developed but does not currently exist;
The industry has low revenues or precaution costs do not increase with revenue; or
The industry has low profits.
Feasibility analysis results in overregulation of industrial sectors where:
The technologically feasible regulation creates costs greater than the benefits from risk
reduction; and
The industry has high revenues, precaution costs increase with revenue, or the industry
has high profits.

Further, the constraint that requires agencies to choose between banning a substance or
activity, or imposing a technologically feasible precaution, prevents agencies from requiring
optimal technological innovation. And the industry-level analysis creates further distortions. If
the technologically feasible regulation is also economically optimal, then a narrow definition of
industry (down to the firm level) inefficiently spares low-revenue and low-profit firms while a
broad definition inefficiently spares all firms in low-revenue and low-profit “industries.” Finally,
feasibility analysis is path-dependent and can result in underregulation if more hazardous
activities are discovered after regulations addressing less hazardous activities are issued.
Under EPA’s approach, other distortions occur. A cost-justified regulation that shuts
down plants, causes job loss, or sends firms into bankruptcy is barred, and a regulation that
excessively reduces risks and hence harms consumers but does not have these other effects is
permitted.
We should immediately note that one might defend feasibility analysis on grounds other
than those of welfare economics. It might seem too obvious to state that any decision-procedure
other than cost-benefit analysis will promote social welfare less well than cost-benefit analysis
does. But matters are considerably more complicated than this.
Initially, it is important to be clear about how feasibility analysis deviates from costbenefit analysis. If these differences seem intuitively appropriate, then we might believe that
these deviations are justified. As we will see, defenders of feasibility analysis believe that one
advantage is that it focuses on plant closures—which can cause concentrated hardship—whereas
cost-benefit analysis ignores them.
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Further, we might agree that social welfare maximization is the appropriate normative
goal, and argue about whether cost-benefit analysis or feasibility analysis is the better decisionprocedure for obtaining that goal. Cost-benefit analysis is an imperfect decision-procedure;
feasibility analysis might be better. Indeed, defenders of feasibility analysis make this argument.
Finally, we might instead reject social welfare maximization as the goal and argue that
agencies should pursue some other normative goal that feasibility analysis happens to promote.
Defenders of feasibility analysis make this argument as well.
We turn to these arguments in the next sections.
B. Feasibility Analysis as a Welfarist Decision-Procedure
Feasibility analysis is a decision-procedure—that is, an instrument or means that agencies
use for the purpose of achieving a normative goal.130 The normative goal itself might be reflected
in the statute or, if the statute is ambiguous, in the policy of the agency or the executive branch.
Let us first suppose that the relevant statute or policy sets the goal of advancing social welfare.
A decision procedure is just a type of rule. Rules (compared to standards) reduce decision
costs but raise error costs.131 The choice between rules and standards depends on the tradeoff
between these costs. In the current setting, agencies could be asked to apply a standard—
maximize social welfare—but most people agree that such a standard provides inadequate
guidance, thus generating high decision costs. The literature discusses various rule-like
procedures that reduce decision costs, including cost-benefit analysis, QALY analysis, risk-risk
analysis, and feasibility analysis.132 Cost-benefit analysis is a “wide” rule that allows the analyst
to take into account a range of costs that regulations impose on people.133 Risk-risk analysis, by
contrast, is narrower: it considers only the effects on lives. Social welfare maximization favors
wider approaches, to the extent that decision costs can be minimized, because people’s welfare
depends on a range of activities and conditions, not just (for example) the bare fact of being
alive. At the same time, cost-benefit analysis minimizes decision costs through the magic of
quantification. Once valuations are obtained from the marketplace and surveys—fixed costs that
can be spread across multiple regulations—decisions are relatively automatic. Judgment must be
used, but standard procedures have developed, which improves monitoring and thus limits
bias.134
The idea that feasibility analysis is a welfarist decision-procedure—that it is justified
because it promotes well-being more effectively than cost-benefit analysis or any other decision130
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procedure does—is not fanciful. David Driesen, the leading defender of feasibility analysis,
appears to take this view, or at least certain elements of his defense are consistent with this view.
In particular, he stresses three welfarist virtues of feasibility analysis: that it ensures that agencies
regulate industrial processes that create harms that are difficult to monetize; that it ensures that
regulation does not impose concentrated harms on workers and spreads the costs of regulation
among consumers; and that it provides clear guidance for agencies, thus avoiding arbitrary and
inconsistent regulatory outcomes. 135 Let us consider these arguments in turn.
Difficulties with monetization. Various substances used in industrial processes cause
harm to humans. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to quantify and monetize those harms.
Regulators may suspect that a substance harms humans because it causes cancer in animals but
lack epidemiological proof that the substance also causes cancer in humans. Regulators might
have evidence that the substance harms some people (for example, cigarette smokers) and might
believe, based on experience, that such a substance will be generally harmful, but lack evidence
that it causes harm to other people. And even when it is clear that substances cause harms, many
harms are difficult to monetize. Some substances might cause bad odors or unsightly air
pollution that does not cause harm to health but bothers people; it is not easy to monetize these
harms.136 Medical costs can be used when the condition is curable, but many conditions are
chronic and bothersome but not deadly; how does one attach a money value to these
experiences? And what if rich people and poor people are affected by the same hazard: should
the well-being of the rich count more because they are willing to pay a higher amount (by virtue
of their wealth alone) to avoid it? Finally, there is the vexed question of valuing avoided
deaths.137
Cost-benefit analysts have struggled with these problems and proposed a range of
imaginative methods for estimating and monetizing harms.138 But many critics of cost-benefit
analysis believe that these estimates are arbitrary or too low, and that the burden of collecting
and analyzing data builds in an unjustified anti-regulatory bias. The chromium and paper mill
regulations were typical in this regard. OSHA believed that exposure to chromium causes
asthma, nasal irritation, and gastrointestinal ulcers but did not include these harms in its costbenefit analysis because of data limitations.139 EPA believed that paper mill discharges cause
various non-cancer illnesses but did not include these harms for the same reason.140 Feasibility
analysis avoids this problem by starting with the assumption that known risks of harm should be
reduced as far as possible, consistent with technological and economic feasibility. Although one
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must identify harmful substances—so, again, lack of available data could still hinder
regulations—once one has done this, it is not necessary to calculate precise risks and to monetize
harms.
This advantage of feasibility analysis, however, comes at a significant cost. If there were
no technological and economic feasibility constraint, feasibility analysis would require agencies
to reduce all risks of harm to zero. Virtually all industrial practices create risks of harm for
workers and for other people exposed to a firm’s pollution. Any serious effort to reduce risks to
zero would require shutting down the economy (in the process no doubt making life less healthy
and more dangerous).141 Feasibility analysis avoids this outcome by stipulating that the economy
should not be shut down. But it does not explain how far regulation should go: at what point
should we regard suppression of economic activity as too great to justify a regulation that
reduces risk?
As we have seen, the agencies have failed to answer this question. OSHA’s approach in
the chromium regulation is clearly arbitrary, but that is only because it is so specific; any similar
approach that refers more vaguely to avoiding plant closings is equally arbitrary. A regulation
that substantially reduces risks of harm should be issued even if it closes many plants. A
regulation that reduces risks of harm very little, while imposing very high costs on consumers,
should not be issued even if it doesn’t close any plants.
A further point is that if the problem with cost-benefit analysis is that it ignores real
harms (as opposed to harms for which there is no evidence because they do not exist), then
multipliers and other simple devices can be used to improve analysis. The government could
conduct periodic retrospective studies of regulations to see whether the cost-benefit analyses that
justified them turned out to be accurate.142 If these retrospective studies reveal that cost-benefit
analysis systematically underestimates the benefits of regulation by (say) a factor of two, then
agencies should be directed to multiply their estimates of benefits by two whenever they conduct
cost-benefit analysis for new regulations.
Plant closings. Driesen argues that feasibility analysis ensures that regulations do not
impose excessively concentrated hardships on workers and communities that depend on the
employment opportunities offered by industrial plants.143 His argument centers on the
distributional consequences of regulation. Concentrated economic costs are more likely to
diminish welfare because of the diminishing marginal value of money; it is more harmful (in
welfare terms) for one person to lose $10,000 than for 10,000 people each to lose $1. Driesen
favors environmental regulation in general because the types of harms caused by pollution—lung
cancer, for instance—are borne by a few individuals, rather than spread. He supports feasibility
analysis in particular because it largely ignores widespread costs borne by consumers (more on
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this later) and concentrates only on avoiding unemployment—a harm borne by comparatively
few individuals.
As an initial matter, the focus on avoiding concentrated harms does not justify feasibility
analysis in a broad range of cases. For instance, suppose that feasibility analysis prevents OSHA
from lowering the Cr (VI) exposure limit to 1 μg/m3 because of the threat of plant closings. The
cost of implementing a weaker exposure limit, rather than this stricter limit, will fall on the
workers who are stricken with lung cancer as a result. The same is true for environmental
regulations: feasibility analysis may force regulators to trade the health (and lives) of a few
individuals for the jobs of a greater number of workers. If the goal of feasibility analysis is to
avoid concentrated harms, preventing job loss at the expense of allowing a greater number of
serious illnesses makes little sense. And this is not even to mention the fact that regulations that
do not cause “widespread plant closings” could nonetheless lead to widespread layoffs—that is,
layoffs from plants that are not entirely shut down.
In addition, in an effort to emphasize larger concentrated costs over smaller dispersed
ones, feasibility analysis errs by valuing those small costs at zero. The complete disregard of
costs other than those related to job loss is deeply puzzling from a welfarist perspective.144
Consider an average person, P. P has a job, breathes the air, eats food, drives a car, raises a
family, purchases entertainment, pays for medical insurance, and so forth. The feasibility test
ensures that a regulation takes account of P’s interest in keeping her job, in having a safe job, and
in breathing the air, but ignores her interests in having cheap and healthy food, maintaining her
car, buying goods for her family, and having access to inexpensive entertainment. Why should
regulations take account of health, safety, and job loss, but nothing else? This same worker is
also a consumer; regulations that raise costs for consumers hurt this worker just as polluted air
does. Indeed, the regulation could lower P’s medical insurance premium by reducing risks that
she faces, but at the same time, by raising the cost of goods, leave her with less disposable
income for purchasing medical insurance in the first place. These effects cannot be evaluated if
the effect of a regulation on the cost of goods is ignored. But that is exactly what the feasibility
test does.
The approach of feasibility analysis thus creates significant problems of over- and
underregulation. Overregulation occurs because feasibility analysis ignores the cost of
regulations to consumers—the costs they incur because prices rise or products disappear from
the market. Underregulation occurs because feasibility analysis tolerates dangerous industrial
practices if regulation would shut down plants. As we have seen, OSHA’s approach to
hexavalent chromium creates other perverse incentives: to reduce the size of firms, to avoid
taking entrepreneurial risks, and so forth. EPA’s approach would also cause distortions—larger
plants, thinner capitalization, et cetera. Cost-benefit analysis, by contrast, takes into account all
the costs that regulations impose on consumers, as well as the benefits.
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It is true that cost-benefit analysis has traditionally ignored the effect of regulation on
employment. The reason is that economists tend to assume that labor markets will adjust in
response to changes in the cost of inputs. Regulations raise the cost of inputs, but these costs can
increase for exogenous reasons; these are simply the facts of life for any employer. In classical
labor market models, firms will enter and exit the market in response to these shocks, and
workers will lose their jobs and obtain jobs at other firms. The cost to workers, if there is one, is
transitional only, and most cost-benefit analysts probably regard them as small relative to the
regulatory benefits and costs to consumers. In addition, workers can self-insure against job loss,
and governments often provide training and other assistance, which reduce the transition costs.
But if all of this is a mistake—if it is appropriate to take into account the hardship costs to
workers who lose their jobs—then cost-benefit analysis can easily accommodate these costs.
Analysts would simply estimate the effect of a regulation on employment, and multiply that
number by the estimated costs of transition or unemployment for the workers in question. In
doing so, analysts would take account of macroeconomic and other conditions that affect the
ability of workers to find new jobs.
If cost-benefit analysis errs when translating dollars into welfare, this problem can be
cured much more accurately and intelligently within the framework of cost-benefit analysis.
Regulators could simply apply multipliers to highly concentrated benefits in accordance with
economists’ best estimates of individuals’ welfare functions. The right approach cannot be to
simply reduce some values in the equation to zero.
Clarity. We have mentioned the many vague concepts used in feasibility analysis.145
Neither technological nor economic feasibility are well-defined concepts; the definition of
industry is also largely arbitrary. Technological feasibility could mean technology that exists or
technology that could be cheaply developed. Given problems of proof, agencies opted for the
first definition, but even then faced challenges from industries that pointed out that technology
that might work in some types of plants does not work in other types—or works only if it is
modified, which requires further costs. We have discussed the problems of economic feasibility:
the OSHA approach in the chromium rule is arbitrary; the EPA approach is indefinite.
The real problem is not the vagueness of words—words are always vague—but the
absence of a theoretically coherent normative basis for feasibility analysis, a theory the analyst
can draw upon in order to flesh out these terms in specific regulatory contexts. Cost-benefit
analysis also uses vague terms, and requires some choices that are relatively arbitrary. But if the
analyst keeps the overall goal of cost-benefit analysis in mind—the promotion of public wellbeing—then the ambiguities can be resolved. Feasibility analysis’s notion of balancing
employment and health/safety provides no similar guidance because it offers no theoretical way
to determine the correct balance.
Driesen argues that feasibility analysis provides clear guidance, pointing out that in
practice regulations tend to avoid plant-closings or revenue losses of more than one to three
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percent; and that agencies usually do not require firms to develop new technologies.146 But this
argument confuses the supposed analytic benefits of feasibility analysis and the ways in which
agencies actually use it. If Driesen’s account is correct, it appears that agencies use the test in the
most conservative way possible in order to avoid litigation or minimize the risk of harm. But that
only suggests that agencies are massively under-regulating when they employ feasibility
analysis.
Our own survey of feasibility analyses by agencies provides little evidence that this test
guides or constrains agencies. As the chromium and paper mill regulations illustrate, the
agencies’ use of the test seems to be ad hoc. The explanations are unpersuasive, the
presumptions or rules they use arbitrary, and the recourse to exceptions frequent and
inadequately justified. Agencies’ record with cost-benefit analysis is not perfect, either,147 and
perhaps agencies could improve their feasibility analysis with practice and guidance from OMB.
But on the evidence so far, the claim that feasibility analysis provides meaningful guidance is
unsupported.
To be sure, feasibility analysis can be made arbitrarily specific, thus driving decision
costs down. The OSHA chromium rule reflects such an attempt. But the error costs become
huge. A regulation that could save many lives at relatively low cost becomes impossible because
the industry is small or poor. Alternatively, feasibility analysis can remain vague, more of a
standard, as in the EPA paper mill approach. Now, however, it becomes difficult to understand
why EPA drew the line it did—one mill shutdown rather than two. At the same time, EPA
continues to ignore costs that matter to people, such as the increase in price of paper. So even
with high decision costs, error costs remain high as well.
C. Does Feasibility Analysis Have an Alternative Normative Basis?
Let us return to the idea that feasibility analysis has an alternative normative basis.148 If it
is not welfarist, what would that basis be? Philosophers distinguish consequentialist and
deontological approaches to ethics. The consequentialist believes that acts should be evaluated
on the basis of the goodness of their consequences; the deontologist believes that acts should be
evaluated on the basis of their own quality—for example, one should not (presumptively) lie
even when lying has good consequences. Within consequentialism, welfarism is only one
version: one could care about consequences for people’s welfare but one could also care about
consequences in other ways—for people’s virtue, for example. And then welfarism can be
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defined in various ways. Welfare might refer to positive subjective experience or mental states;
the satisfaction of desires (or of certain desires); or objective goods (such as education).149
Feasibility analysis clearly does not reflect deontological thinking; we have argued that it
does not reflect welfarism in any straightforward sense. Welfarism normally suggests that all
aspects of a person’s well-being be taken into account, not just aspects of well-being related to
employment, health, and safety. Perhaps, though, feasibility analysis can be based on a version
of welfarism that stresses these conditions over all others. This could be attached to
incommensurability worries—that certain values shouldn’t be traded off each other, that it is
wrong for an agency to hold off regulating a substance that damages workers’ lungs so that
consumer products will be a few dollars cheaper.150
Most economists reject this argument but philosophers have taken it seriously.151 One
school of thought holds that goods contribute to well-being only if the agent would rationally
prefer those goods under full information. Others argue that well-being is objective, in the sense
that people’s well-being depends on their being able to engage in certain activities regardless of
whether they actually desire to engage in these activities. Martha Nussbaum, for example,
suggests the following objective list of qualities that comprise welfare: bodily health; bodily
integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation (including the
goods of both friendship and self-respect); play; other species; and control over one’s
environment (including both political rights and property rights).152 Other accounts emphasize
different goods but are largely consistent.153
Feasibility analysis advances bodily health and bodily integrity but it does not take into
account the other goods, with the result that regulations will favor only two of the eight items on
Nussbaum’s list and, similarly, a small portion of the goods on other philosophers’ lists.
Affiliation requires access to transportation so that one can visit friends, attend political
meetings, and the like. Control over one’s environment presupposes the affordability of goods
that one needs in order to manipulate the environment. Tradeoffs must be made. Sometimes
these tradeoffs are tragic—people are forced to choose between goods about which they have
fundamental entitlements.154 Sometimes they are not. If a person chooses to move from a very
clean rural area to a very slightly polluted city in order to take advantage of cultural
opportunities, but in doing so takes a miniscule risk of early death, this is hardly a tragedy. In
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either case, a regulatory decision-procedure that requires agencies to focus on health and bodily
integrity to the exclusion of all else would not advance people’s well-being.
If standard economic accounts of well-being are to be rejected and replaced with
philosophical accounts that distrust (some of) people’s choices, that may be reasonable, but then
the challenge is to invent a decision-procedure that reflects the proper interpretation of wellbeing. An objective or limited desire-based approach will exclude certain goods and activities
that people care about but not those that feasibility analysis ignores. Cost-benefit analysis will
continue to be appropriate as long as a sufficient portion of consumer choices continue to be
respected under the alternative approach. If not, it can be modified so that people’s preferences
for objectively bad or rationally undesirable goods are ignored.155
But our goal is not to defend cost-benefit analysis. It is certainly possible that this
decision-procedure is not consistent with the correct theory of well-being. It is, however,
consistent with a range of reasonable conceptions of well-being. Feasibility analysis is not. No
attempt to reverse-engineer a theory of well-being that justifies feasibility analysis has been
successful.
D. The Politics of Feasibility Analysis
If our analysis is correct so far, feasibility analysis does not necessarily have a pro- or
anti-regulatory bias. In some sectors it results in overregulation; in others it results in
underregulation. It is impossible to say anything more general. Yet in political debates, proregulatory groups generally favor feasibility analysis, while anti-regulatory groups favor costbenefit analysis. What explains this pattern?
We do not know the answer but can speculate. Cost-benefit analysis is associated with
the administration of Ronald Reagan, who sought to deregulate entire sectors of the economy
and curtail regulation in others. Although cost-benefit analysis had been used in government
before then, Reagan was the first to institutionalize it—to require agencies to use it as a matter of
routine—and therefore cost-benefit analysis is associated with an anti-regulatory mentality. It
may well have been introduced by Reagan’s OMB because he and other political leaders
believed that most regulations do not in fact pass the cost-benefit test or because cost-benefit
analysis would introduce bureaucratic hurdles that would at least slow down regulation.156
Whatever they might have thought, many regulations since then have passed the cost-benefit
test.157
Feasibility analysis, by contrast, has been understood to apply when statutes forbid
considerations of cost, and it would therefore naturally seem to support strict regulations that are
not clearly cost-justified. As we have seen, however, the technological and economic feasibility
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conditions can be interpreted in quite a stringent way, so as to bar regulation that cost-benefit
analysis would permit. In their anxiety to refute cost-benefit analysis, proponents of regulation
have had to fall back on feasibility analysis as an alternative, but they have not realized that
feasibility analysis might be no more favorable to regulation than cost-benefit analysis is.
Indeed, there is a possible public choice interpretation of feasibility analysis that is in
tension with good-government premises: it may reflect a political deal between industry, on the
one hand, and environmental or labor groups, on the other. Industry receives protection from
regulations that greatly reduce profits; environmental and labor groups obtain reductions in
workplace accidents and environmental pollution. The loser is the consumer, whose interests
receive zero weight. This pattern is reproduced in the dispute over the meaning of feasibility
itself. Most of the interpretations of this term—those emphasizing plant closures, lost revenues,
lost profits, and firm bankruptcies—favor organized interests. Plant closures outrage
communities and their political representatives. Lost revenues and profits, and bankruptcies,
make businesses unhappy. Job loss that is spread across industries receives no attention, just like
consumer welfare, because the affected people are not politically organized.
Why then has industry shifted its support to cost-benefit analysis? One possibility is that
feasibility analysis in the hands of agencies proved so easily manipulated that the deal came
unstuck. Agencies, staffed with people deeply committed to their regulatory mission, went
beyond the limits that feasibility analysis was supposed to impose—or so businesses might have
believed.158 Businesses threw their weight behind Ronald Reagan and supported cost-benefit
analysis because at least that approach is more predictable. Or it may be that presidents—
including Reagan’s successors—are not as vulnerable to interest group pressure as Congress is,
and so insisted on cost-benefit analysis because it would improve public welfare, possibly
redounding to the electoral benefit of the president, rather than send rents to interest groups. This
would explain why the executive branch has championed cost-benefit analysis across five
administrations (both Democratic and Republican), while Congress has wavered between the
standards, influenced sometimes by businesses and at other times by pro-regulatory groups.
A final point: it is possible to imagine conditions under which feasibility is both proregulatory in impact and desirable from a broad social welfare standpoint, but these conditions
are very unlikely to exist. Suppose that agencies have “ideal points”—in the language of political
science—at the same place in the political spectrum that the public has.159 Agencies, in other
words, are good agents for the public interest. Cost-benefit analysis, correctly performed, would
put agencies in the same location on the ideological spectrum. However, cost-benefit analysis is
expensive and crude160 and accordingly would create a drag on otherwise optimal regulation.
Perhaps in this case a weaker standard such as feasibility would be preferable. But this argument
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for feasibility analysis is very tricky. No standard at all would be better still if agencies act in the
public interest when unconstrained; the feasibility standard would be desirable only if agencies
tend to underestimate harm to workers and overestimate costs to consumers, so that a direction to
pay attention to workers and ignore consumers would somehow balance out the agencies’ natural
inclinations and produce optimal incentives to regulate. If this is the case for feasibility
analysis—and it is the only one we can think of—a great deal of empirical work would be
necessary to prevail over one’s natural skepticism about the accuracy of these premises.
One could put this argument differently. If agencies are inclined to under-regulate, and
cost-benefit analysis would only exacerbate this tendency because of the costs and hurdles it
introduces, then it may well make sense to refrain from requiring agencies to conduct costbenefit analysis. But some standard must be used. Feasibility analysis does not necessarily
correct for the deficiencies of cost-benefit analysis because it invites agencies to stop regulating
in order to avoid negative economic impacts. At the same time, it encourages agencies to ignore
other costs that matter. The most straightforward solution to the problem of under-regulation—if
it is a problem, which is far from clear—would be to fund and staff agencies more generously
and to invest in improvements in the practice of cost-benefit analysis.
Conclusion
We have discovered no reason for agencies to use feasibility analysis, and, given its
ambiguity and its unacceptable normative implications, we doubt that agencies actually allow it
to guide their decision-making. Most likely, agencies engage in informal cost-benefit balancing
while taking into account political constraints that exist because of public (or congressional)
hostility to plant closings, or they simply strike a deal with employers and labor and
environmental groups at the expense of consumers. Whether feasibility analysis actually
constrains agencies or serves as a subterfuge for decisions arrived at on other grounds, it has no
place in regulatory decisionmaking.
Remedies are straightforward. Where statutes delegate agencies policymaking authority,
those agencies should exercise their power under the Chevron doctrine to replace feasibility
analysis with cost-benefit analysis or another suitable decision-procedure. OIRA should
encourage agencies to take this step; it might reasonably go so far as to forbid agencies to use
feasibility analysis to the extent permitted by law. Courts should adopt a presumption that
regulatory statutes do not authorize feasibility analysis. Congress should refrain from
incorporating the feasibility test in regulatory statutes, and should amend existing statutes so that
they no longer do so.
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Selected Feasibility-Triggering Statutes

Statute Name

“Feasible” Statutes
The Occupational
Safety and Health
Act of 1970
Mine Act

U.S. Code
Number

Language
(Emphasis Added)

29 U.S.C. § 652(8)

“…requires conditions…reasonably necessary or appropriate to
provide…”
“…the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on
the basis of the best available evidence…”
“…standards which most adequately assure on the basis of the best
available evidence that no miner will suffer material impairment…”
Additional considerations to “highest degree of health and safety”
include “the latest available scientific data…, the feasibility of the
standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety
laws.”

29 U.S.C. §
655(b)(5)
30 U.S.C. §
811(a)(6)(A)

“Best Available” / “Maximum Available” Statutes
Clean Air Act
42 U.S.C. §
“…subject to the best available control technology for each pollutant…”
- Prevention of
7475(a)(4)
Significant
Deterioration
program

- National
Ambient Air
Quality Standards

42 U.S.C. §
7479(3)

Defines BACT as “…maximum degree of reduction…taking into
account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other
costs…”

Clean Air Act
- Emission
Standards
Clean Air Act
- Standards of
Performance for
New Stationary
Sources

42 U.S.C. §
7412(d)(2)

“maximum degree of reduction…achievable..taking into consideration
the cost of achieving such emission reduction…”

42 U.S.C. §
7411(a)(1)

“best system of emission reduction…taking into account the cost…and
any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements…[that has been] adequately demonstrated”
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Clean Water Act

33 U.S.C. §
1326(b)
33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)(A)(i)
33 U.S.C. §
1314(b)(2)(B)

33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)
33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(2)(B)
33 U.S.C. §
1316(a)(1)
33 U.S.C. §
1316(b)(1)(B)

“…reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact…”
“best available technology economically achievable…, which will result
in reasonable further progress…”
Factors “shall” include “age of equipment and facilities involved, the
process employed, the engineering aspects of the application…, process
changes, the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water quality
environment impact (including energy requirements), and such other
factors as the Administrator deems appropriate.”
“best available demonstrated control technology” taking cost into
account
“…take into account…the cost of achieving such effluent reduction.”

“…greatest degree of effluent reduction…achievable through…best
available demonstrated control technology…”
“…take into consideration the cost of achieving such effluent reduction,
and any non-water quality environmental impact and energy
requirements.”
“Reasonably Available” / “Best Practicable” Statutes
Clean Air Act
42 U.S.C. §
“…through the adoption, at a minimum, of reasonably available control
7502(c)(1)
technology”
(formerly 42
U.S.C. §
7502(b)(3))

Clean Water Act

33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(1)(A)(i)
33 U.S.C. §
1314(b)(1)(B)

“best practicable control technology currently available”
“Factors…include consideration of the total cost of application of
technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved.”
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Table A2: OSHA’s Analysis of Chromium High-Impact Industries
Industry

Compliance
Costs as a
Percentage of
Revenue
Electroplating – General Industry
Specialty Trade
0.43%
Contractors (NAICS
238)
Electroplating, Plating,
1.24%
Polishing Anodizing and
Coloring Services
(NAICS 332813)

Wholesale Trade,
Durable Goods (NAICS
423)
Motor Vehicle and Parts
Dealers (NAICS 441)
Furniture and Home
Furnishing Stores
(NAICS 442)
Electronics and
Appliance Stores
(NAICS 443)
Building Materials and
Garden Equipment and
Supplies Dealers
(NAICS 444)
Health and Personal
Care Stores (NAICS
446)
Miscellaneous Store
Retailers (NAICS 453)
Nonstore Retailers
(NAICS 454)
Information Services
and Data Processing
Service (NAICS 519)
Rental and Leasing
Services (NAICS 532)
Professional, Scientific,

Compliance
Costs as a
Percentage of
Profits

Explanation of Deviation from Screening

11.14%

Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300

30.15%

Sells service not product, so overseas competition
shouldn’t be strong. Electroplating is “essential to
the manufacture of most plated products,”
implying that demand is unlikely to decrease.
Experienced and survived profit variation of up to
49% in single year. 1.24% price increase is
“significantly less than the average annual increase
in price.” Demand is inelastic because plating just
a component of product’s total cost (less than
0.5%).
71 Fed. Reg. 10301
Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300

0.28%

11.01%

0.23%

16.27%

0.66%

17.59%

0.50%

14.70%

Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300

0.55%

11.18%

Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300

0.44%

17.46%

Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300

0.71%

22.73%

0.61%

16.01%

3.12%

35.01%

Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300

0.86%

34.20%

0.85%

13.52%

Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300

Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Only a few establishments reported use.
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and Technical Services
(NAICS 541)
Administrative and
1.05%
27.60%
Support Services
(NAICES 561)
Performing Arts,
5.17%
54.93%
Spectator Sports, and
Related Industries
(NAICS 711)
Personal and Laundry
2.58%
49.92%
Services (NAICS 812)
Welding - General Industry (Stainless Steel)
Gasoline Stations
0.22%
29.52%
(NAICS 447)
Nursing and Residential 1.56%
30.07%
Care (NAICS 623)
Social Assistance
1.14%
22.34%
(NAICS 624)
Food Services and
0.49%
11.93%
Drinking Places (NAICS
722)
Repair and Maintenance 0.40%
10.49%
(NAICS 811)

Personal and Laundry
Services (NAICS 812)

0.67%

71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Not counted in the tally of 31 high impact
industries and no explanation given. Likely only a
few establishments reported use.
Only one establishment reported use; possible
mistake.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Only a few establishments reported use.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300
Given that it is a service industry, demand for
repairs should remain relatively constant and
foreign competition should not pose a problem.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302
Given that it is a service industry, demand for
repairs should remain relatively constant and
foreign competition should not pose a problem.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302
Only one establishment reported use; possible
mistake.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300

13.02%

Religious, Grantmaking, 3.91%
158.08%
Civil, Professional and
Similar Organizations
(NAICS 813)
Welding – Construction Industry (Stainless Steel)
Building, Developing,
0.92%
22.33%
and General
Contracting; Heavy
Construction; Special
Trade Contractors
(NAICS 233, 234, 235)
Welding - General Industry (Carbon Steel)
Religious, Grantmaking, 1.00%
40.34%
Civil, Professional and
Similar Organizations
(NAICS 813)
Painting – General Industry
Motor Vehicle Body and 0.51%
20.44%
Trailer Manufacturing

Passing costs on would only increase price 0.92%
and steel prices have varied more than 10% a year
without affecting the industry.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302

Only one establishment reported use; possible
mistake.
71 Fed. Reg. 10300

Merely part of manufacturing process, so the
actual cost is insignificant in terms of the final
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(NAICS 3362)
Military Armored
Vehicle, Tank, and Tank
Component
Manufacturers (NAICS
336992)
Used Car Dealers
(NAICS 44112)

0.25%

10.14%

0.41%

33.66%

Automotive Body, Paint, 1.50%
and Interior Repair and
Maintenance (NAICS
811121)
Chromium Catalyst Producers
All Other Basic
0.80%
Inorganic Chemical
Manufacturers (NAICS
325188)
Iron and Steel Foundries
Iron Foundries; Steel
0.42%
Investment Foundries;
Steel Foundries (Except
Investment) (NAICS
3315, 331512, 331513)

39.16%

product price and should be largely passed on.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302
Merely part of manufacturing process, so the
actual cost is insignificant in terms of the final
product price and should be largely passed on.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302
Cr (VI) alternatives already exist, the use of Cr
(VI) is only a small portion of the actual business,
and demand is probably fairly inelastic.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302
Cr (VI) alternatives are already developed, the use
of Cr (VI) is only a small portion of the actual
business, and demand is probably fairly inelastic.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302

27.14%

Short-term demand is relatively inelastic since
most companies would need major new
investments to shift away from CR(VI) catalysts.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302

15.30%

Monitoring costs make up 44% of estimated
compliance costs, but such costs could be reduced
to less than 10% of profits if performance-based
monitoring is used instead of scheduled periodic
monitoring. Industry has absorbed 32% increase in
price of steel over past two years and survived.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302

Chromium Catalyst Users – Service Companies
Other Services to
0.44%
11.59%
Buildings and
Dwellings, Including
Catalyst Handling
(NAICS 325110)

Demand should remain constant since companies
are more likely to turn to service companies when
regulation increased.
71 Fed. Reg. 10302

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Jonathan Masur
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
jmasur@uchicago.edu
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